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All of it was true. The truth and nothing but the truth. But not quite all the truth. What I left 
out was my business. (Raymond Chandler, The Long Good-Bye) 
 
The final version of this paper will appear in a special issue of Teorema on ‘The Aim of Belief’, guest-
edited by José Zalabardo. When citing, please refer to the published version. 
 
1  Norms 
It is correct to believe that Steinbeck wrote East of Eden, incorrect to believe that Updike 
wrote Cannery Row. It is right to believe that tomatoes are a fruit, wrong to believe that 
apples are a vegetable. More generally, true beliefs are correct or right, false beliefs are 
incorrect or wrong. This suggests that a norm of truth governs the state or attitude of belief.  
Since it is wrong or incorrect to do what one may not do, one might try to capture this 
suggestion with the following principle:
1 
  (TRUTH)    One may believe that p if and only if it is true that p.
2, 3 
Other candidate norms for belief include: 
(RATIONALITY)  One may believe that p if and only if it is rational to believe 
that p.
4 
                                                           
* Thanks to Tsung-Hsing Ho and Javier González de Prado Salas for comments on this paper, and to Conor 
McHugh for many discussions of the issues it concerns. 
1 Some deny that belief is governed by a general normative principle of any sort (see Papineau Forthcoming). 
Such views are not my present concern. 
2 I advance the claim that (TRUTH) governs belief in Whiting 2010. Though they differ in how they formulate 
the norm, Boghossian (2008), Gibbard (2005), Littlejohn (2012), Millar (2009), Shah and Velleman (2005), and 
Wedgwood (2002) defend similar claims. 
3 Note that ‘may’ here and in all the norms which follow has narrow scope. 2 
 
(KNOWLEDGE)  One may believe that p if and only if one knows that p.
5 
It is an open question to what extent these principles are in competition. A common proposal 
is that a standard like (RATIONALITY) is in some way derived from or generated by the more 
fundamental (TRUTH) (cf. Boghossian 2008: 101). A similar though less common proposal is 
that (KNOWLEDGE) too is a consequence of (TRUTH) (cf. Wedgwood 2002). A less 
compromising position would be to reject one or both of (RATIONALITY) and (KNOWLEDGE), 
at least as stated.
6 In this paper, I shall not pursue such matters. Instead, I shall focus on 
defending the formulation I have given of the norm of truth governing belief against various 
objections. 
  Other than to accommodate examples like those above, why accept (TRUTH)? There 
are a number of considerations which support doing so; for the purposes of this paper, I shall 
highlight the following. First, (TRUTH) promises to explain what is problematic about holding 
so-called Moorean
7 beliefs, such as that I believe that dogs bark but dogs do not bark, a 
belief which is consistent and (so) might be true. Very roughly, the explanation proceeds as 
follows. If I were to have such a belief, I would take myself to hold an attitude governed by a 
certain norm while at the same time taking that attitude not to satisfy that norm (cf. Millar 
2009).  
Second, if (TRUTH) holds, that might go some way to explaining why subjects take 
only evidence to provide reason or justification for believing.
8 Only evidence that p indicates 
that, were a subject to believe that p, she would satisfy the standard to which that attitude is 
subject. By the same token, if (TRUTH) holds, that might account for other general principles 
governing belief, such as that one ought not to believe something when the evidence indicates 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
4 Feldman (2000) defends a version of (RATIONALITY). 
5 Williamson (2000) defends a version of (KNOWLEDGE). 
6 For critical discussion of the view that knowledge is the norm for belief, see Whiting Forthcoming-a. 
7 After Moore 1962: 277ff. 
8 As I use the term here, a justification is a consideration which stands to what one may do as a reason stands to 
what one ought to do. So, while a reason for φing speaks in favour of φing, a justification might not speak in 
favour of φing, though it does not speak against it.  3 
 
otherwise. One should not believe against one’s evidence since, in doing so, one might 
violate (TRUTH).
9 
Third, by appeal to (TRUTH), one might explain why a subject is motivated (not) to 
believe a proposition when she takes herself to have evidence for (or against) it (cf. Shah and 
Velleman 2005). If a subject accepts (TRUTH), she is moved by considerations which seem to 
show that having a given belief would (not) accord with that norm, which considerations 
constitute evidence.  
I shall return to each of these points in due course. (TRUTH) might be explanatorily 
significant in a further respect. Some suggest that it is constitutive of an attitude’s being one 
of belief that it is subject to a norm of truth. I shall assume that, if the norm holds, it does so 
necessarily but I shall not take a stand on what this might tell us about the nature of belief. 
That is a topic for another occasion. 
 
2  Aims 
In addition to talk of a norm which governs belief, it is common to hear talk of an aim which 
governs belief. Some think that talk of belief’s aim can only be metaphorical, more 
specifically, that it is best understood as a figurative expression of (TRUTH): 
 
It is often claimed that belief aims at truth. […] But this claim is obviously not literally true. 
Beliefs are not little archers armed with little bows and arrows: they do not literally ‘aim’ at 
anything. This claim must be interrupted as a metaphor.  
I propose to interpret this claim as a normative claim—roughly, as the claim that a 
belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is true. (Wedgwood 2002: 267) 
 
                                                           
9 This is an example of the attempt to derive a version of (RATIONALITY) from (TRUTH). 4 
 
Others take the claim at face value (see Velleman 2000). Belief aims (only) at truth, they 
suggest, in the sense that it is part of the function of a state or attitude of belief to be true, 
where its having that function consists in its being causally regulated in ways designed to 
ensure that it is true.  
It is common for those who understand belief’s aim in this way to advance the 
(teleological) proposal that the norms governing belief, like (TRUTH), are derived from its 
aim. A false belief is wrong or incorrect, on this view, because it fails to fulfil its function. As 
Velleman says: 
 
To say that belief aims at the truth is not simply to re-express the norm stipulating that a 
belief must be true in order to be correct; rather, it is to point out a fact about belief that 
generates this norm for its correctness. (2000: 16-17) 
 
There is a way to take talk of aims governing belief seriously without taking it to 
concern the functional role of belief-states or the sub-personal mechanisms regulating them—
one can take it to concern an aim which the subject has with respect to believing. It is 
legitimate to say that a newspaper article aims to shock but what that comes to is that the 
person writing the article does so with the aim of shocking. In a similar fashion, it is 
legitimate to say that a belief aims only at the truth but what that comes to is that a person 
aims to believe something only if it is true.
10  
Some are sceptical that beliefs in general are governed by an aim which the subject 
possesses: 
 
Only some instances of belief are caused by the goal-directed activity of their subjects; many 
others are the product of processes such as perception, which don’t involve any agential goals 
                                                           
10 For discussion and defence of this formulation of the aim, see Whiting 2012. 5 
 
or intentions. If the metaphor that belief aims at the truth is not to rule out most cases of belief, 
it will have to draw on a wider notion of truth-directedness, encompassing non-agential 
mechanisms that track the truth. (Shah and Velleman 2005: 498-499) 
 
This seems confused. In general, the fact that a subject has a certain aim has consequences for 
how she is inclined or motivated to act, and for what reason or justification she takes (what 
appear to her to be) the facts to provide (cf. Alvarez 2010: ch. 3). If I aim to lose weight, it 
does not follow that when I lose weight I do so intentionally or as a (direct or indirect) result 
of aiming to do so; the weight-loss might be due to an overactive thyroid. Nonetheless, given 
my aim to lose weight, I am inclined to take exercise, motivated not to consume protein and 
carbohydrates at the same time, and take the fact that the shake is high in calories to be a 
reason not to drink it. In a similar way, if I aim to believe only the truth, it does not follow 
that when I believe a proposition I do so intentionally or as a (direct or indirect) result of 
having that aim; rather, if given that aim, I am inclined not to pay attention to unreliable 
witnesses, motivated not to believe that Smith killed Jones having learned that Smith was on 
holiday at the time of the shooting, and take the fact that it is snowing to justify believing that 
it is cold outside. Even if a certain belief, say, that the kettle is boiling, results from 
perception, it remains the case that I would be moved to revise that belief were I to take it to 
clash with other things which I know, say, that the kettle is broken. 
  These remarks in turn point to something which speaks in favour of attributing the 
aim which governs belief to a subject. It is a subject, not a state of the subject, who takes 
(what appears to her to be) a certain fact to provide reason or justification for believing 
something, and who is motivated not to believe certain things when presented with 
counterevidence. The suggestion that a subject aims to believe only the truth promises to 
provide a straightforward explanation of this in a way which the suggestion that belief-states 6 
 
are causally regulated by certain sub-personal mechanisms seems not to (which, of course, is 
not to deny that belief-states are so regulated).  
  As the preceding discussion shows, I do not think that talk of aims with respect to 
believing is merely a dark but suggestive way of talking about the norms of belief. But nor do 
I accept the teleological proposal that from the aim governing belief one can derive the norms 
to which that attitude is subject. The fact that someone aims to do something does not 
generally entail that she has reason to do that thing (unless there is reason to have that aim).
11 
That Augustus aims to gorge himself on chocolate does not entail that Augustus has reason to 
gorge himself on chocolate, that he should do so, or that his doing so would be correct. 
However, if Augustus takes himself to have reason to gorge himself on chocolate, or if he 
accepts a norm according to which he should do so, he might as a result aim to gorge himself 
on chocolate. In a similar fashion, I suggest, the fact that a subject aims to believe only the 
truth is a consequence of her (perhaps tacit) acceptance of (TRUTH).  
   
3  Ought and may 
According to (TRUTH), if a proposition is false, one ought not to believe it but, if a 
proposition is true, it is only the case that one may believe it, not that one ought to do so. 
Why, one might ask, formulate the norm in this way? Why not think, with Gibbard (2005) 
and Horwich (1998: 187), among others, that one should believe a proposition when it is true? 
Indeed, Olinder (2012: §3) objects to my formulation of the norm governing belief precisely 
on the grounds that it does not do justice to some version of this thought. 
  The claim that, if a proposition is true, one ought to believe it clashes with the 
principle that ought implies can (cf. Boghossian 2008: 100; Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007). 
                                                           
11 The standard response to this point is to appeal to the suggestion that the relevant aim is constitutive of belief, 
in the sense that an attitude or state is one of belief only if governed by that aim. Without denying the 
constitutive claim, I doubt this answers the objection. It might be true that having a certain aim is constitutive of 
φing and also true that that aim is not worth having (in which case, it is not worth φing). For trenchant criticism 
of the idea that practical norms might be grounded in what is constitutive of agency, see Enoch 2006. 7 
 
There are truths which are so complex that it is impossible to believe them, for example, the 
truth consisting of the conjunction of all the truths about the dimensions and mass of each 
grain of sand on each beach in Cornwall. Since one ought to φ only if it is possible for one to 
φ, it follows that it is not the case that one ought to believe that truth.
12 
  One might think that (TRUTH) faces a similar problem, since, according to it, I may 
believe the (unbelievable) complex truth about grains of sand. However, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Whiting 2010: 216-217), there is no principle that may implies can. To say that 
one may φ is to say that it is not the case that one ought not to φ. Clearly, it does not have to 
be possible for one to φ for it not to be the case that one ought not to φ. 
  As a variation on the theme, suppose that Mulder is simply unable not to believe that 
there are aliens—he cannot but believe this. Suppose also that there are no aliens. According 
to (TRUTH), Mulder ought not to believe that there are aliens. Surely, the critic of (TRUTH) 
might say, this conflicts with the principle that ought (not) implies can (not). 
  The case of Mulder is one in which it is psychologically impossible for a subject not 
to believe something. In contrast, it is humanly impossible for a subject to believe the 
conjunction of all the truths about the grains of sand (or, for that matter, all of those truths 
individually). Standardly, proponents of the principle that ought implies can take the relevant 
possibility to be weaker than psychological possibility. If Scrooge is psychologically unable 
to raise staff salaries, this hardly releases him from the obligation to do so. In contrast, since 
it is not humanly possible for Scrooge to travel to Christmas past, it cannot be the case that he 
should do so. 
   A critic of (TRUTH) might persevere. Perhaps there are falsehoods which it is not 
humanly possible not to believe. If so, it cannot be the case that one ought not to believe them. 
                                                           
12 There are various ways in which the proponent of the idea that truth is governed by a norm according to 
which subjects ought to believe what is true might try to reformulate the norm so as to avoid this problem. 
Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007) anticipate and criticise (convincingly, in my view) many such reformulations. 8 
 
  I do not think we need to take this line of thought seriously. Regarding truths which it 
is humanly impossible to believe, we know that they actually exist. But the critic of (TRUTH) 
has only appealed to the mere possibility of falsehoods which it is humanly impossible not to 
believe. She has not shown that such cases are genuine, or even that they are genuinely 
possible. Indeed, if there were an attitude toward a proposition which a human could not but 
have, it is not clear that it would count as a belief, properly so-called, insensitive as it is to 
evidence, isolated as it is from our practices of belief revision, insulated as it is from the 
processes through which we rationally update our belief-system, and so on. 
  Pursuing these matters would take us far afield—the principle that ought implies can 
is controversial and even those who accept it disagree over how to interpret it. Fortunately, 
there are considerations which have nothing to do with that principle which count against 
building into (TRUTH) the idea that one ought to believe what is true.  
  It a platitude that it is wrong not to do what one ought to do.
13 If Elliot ought to 
apologise to Stanley, it is wrong of him not to do so. It is also a platitude that it is wrong to 
believe a falsehood. If Holly believes that Spielberg directed Days of Heaven, she is wrong. 
In contrast, it is not wrong not to believe a truth. It is not wrong for Holly not to believe that 
Ozu directed Late Spring. Since it is not wrong not to believe a truth, and since it is wrong 
not to do what one ought to do, then it is not the case that one ought to believe the truth. 
Perhaps there are situations in which it is wrong not to believe a truth, and so in which 
one ought to do so. It might be wrong for a driving instructor in the UK not to believe that 
vehicles there drive on the left—she really should know this. But in this case it is not the 
mere truth of the relevant proposition that makes it the case that the instructor ought to 
                                                           
13 This claim requires qualification. Some distinguish what one ought to do relative to the facts, relative to the 
evidence, relative to one’s beliefs, and so on. One might then distinguish corresponding respects in which 
something can be wrong. The claim would then be that it is wrong in such-and-such respect if one does not do 
what one ought relative-to-such-and-such to do. 9 
 
believe it but additional considerations relating in a fairly obvious fashion to her role and 
responsibilities.  
  This asymmetry between truth and falsity—the fact that there is reason not to believe 
falsehoods in a way that there is not reason to believe truths—is interesting and, perhaps, 
surprising. I do not pretend to have a satisfactory explanation for it but here is a thought. If 
one has false beliefs, it follows that to that extent one is out of touch with reality, one does 
not have a grip on it. If one has true beliefs, it does not follow that to that extent one is in 
touch with reality or that one has a grip on it; after all, one’s beliefs might be irrational, or 
unjustified, or accidentally true, or…. Consider a subject who believes that there is a barn in 
the field but does not know that there is a barn in the field. Even if what she believes is true, 
she does not believe what she does in light of the fact that there is a barn in the field, and so 
in turn she cannot act or hold other attitudes in light of that fact.
14 It seems, then, that false 
beliefs (as such) are detrimental in a way that true beliefs (as such) are not beneficial. This 
might go some way to helping us to make sense of the asymmetry.
15 
  Interestingly, one finds a similar asymmetry with respect to things which are 
analogous to beliefs: maps. If a London Transport map represents Waterloo as being on the 
Victoria Line, it is a bad map. A cartographer ought to revise the map, and a tourist or 
commuter has reason not to use it. In contrast, the actual London Transport map is not a bad 
map because it does not represent certain details of the area it covers, such as the geographic 
locations of the stations, or because there are areas it does not cover, such as Chicago; on the 
contrary, it is widely acknowledged to be, for these very reasons, a good map. It is not the 
case that a cartographer ought to revise it, and a tourist or commuter has no reason not to use 
it. 
                                                           
14 For more on the relationship between knowing that p and being able to act in light of the fact that p, see 
Hyman 1999.  
15 For more on this theme, see Whiting Forthcoming-b. 10 
 
  So, generally-speaking, a map should not be inaccurate but it need not be 
comprehensive; everything that a map covers it ought not to cover unfaithfully while it is not 
the case that a map ought to cover everything faithfully. Presumably, what details a map 
should include, or what area it should encompass, depends in appreciable but difficult to spell 
out ways on the needs and interests it is to serve.  
Returning to the issue at hand, if, as Ramsey suggests (1990: 146), a belief or belief-
system ‘is a map of neighbouring space by which we steer’, it is to be expected that those 
beliefs one has about that space ought not to be false but not that one ought to have true 
beliefs about everything in that space, let alone of everything outside of it.
16 
 
4  Moorean propositions 
I suggested above that appealing to (TRUTH) might explain what is problematic about 
believing certain Moorean propositions.
17 One might think that, on the contrary, such 
propositions create difficulties for (TRUTH). Consider: 
  (MOORE)  Dogs bark but I do not believe that dogs bark. 
Suppose that (MOORE) is true. According to (TRUTH), I may believe it. However, were I to do 
so, (MOORE) would be false.
18 So, I would then have a belief which, according to (TRUTH), I 
should not have.
19 
As I admit in an earlier paper, ‘there is […] something rather fishy about the notion of 
a permission which, when acted upon, results in one’s doing something one is not permitted 
to do’ (2010: 218). In the same paper, I propose amending (TRUTH) so as to exclude cases 
                                                           
16 This point depends only on the thought that beliefs are analogous to maps, not that they are maps. For 
discussion and defence of a ‘map theory’ of belief, see Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 2007: ch. 11.  
17 One might think that the appeal to (TRUTH) alone cannot explain what is problematic about believing a 
Moorean proposition such as that it is raining but I do not know that it is raining. For discussion, see Whiting 
Forthcoming-a. 
18 The second conjunct would be false on the assumption that, if I believe the conjunction, I believe each of its 
conjuncts. There is a longer way of telling the story which does not depend on that assumption. 
19 Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007) are responsible for this line of thought, though they do not discuss the 
formulation of the norm of truth I provide here. 11 
 
like (MOORE) by restricting it to those propositions one can truly believe. But I now recognise 
that this looks ad hoc (cf. McHugh 2012: n34). 
Sorensen (1988) calls a proposition like (MOORE) a ‘blindspot’ for belief. It is a 
blindspot in the sense that the proposition, though consistent, is unavailable to belief; it is not 
a proposition toward which one can adopt that attitude. Very roughly, Sorensen’s explanation 
for why Moorean propositions are blindspots for belief proceeds as follows. Subjects have the 
‘doxastic goals of getting truth and avoiding error’ (1988: 37). These goals impose 
‘constraints’ on believing, constraints which could not be satisfied if (per impossibile) the 
object of belief were to be a proposition like (MOORE). Were a subject to believe (MOORE), 
she would be ‘committed’ (in an intuitive sense) to both believing that dogs bark and to not 
believing that dogs bark. Were the subject to follow through on her commitments, she would 
have inconsistent beliefs, and hence would fail to satisfy the relevant doxastic goals. Thus, 
‘Given the constraints imposed by certain desiderata of belief, I cannot believe [(MOORE)] 
even though it is a consistent proposition’ (1988: 53).  
Insofar as this story appeals to goals—akin to the aim to believe (only) what is true—
and resultant constraints—or norms—which govern believing, it is congenial to the 
proponent of (TRUTH). By appeal to it, she might respond to the above objection. Since a 
proposition like (MOORE) is unbelievable, there will be no situation in which a subject 
believes what, according to (TRUTH), she may believe, only to find herself believing what, 
according to (TRUTH), she should not.  
One might worry about a norm which states that one may do something one cannot do 
(cf. McHugh 2012: n33). But, as discussed earlier, there is no principle that may implies can. 
I have a lot of sympathy for the view that Moorean propositions are blindspots, so 
conceived. But I do not know how to defend or bolster the view and, in my experience, it is 
not widely shared. Fortunately, I do not think it is necessary to pursue the issue for present 12 
 
purposes. Even if it is possible to believe the relevant Moorean proposition, the thought that 
this poses a problem for (TRUTH) involves a misunderstanding. According to (TRUTH), a 
situation in which (MOORE) is true is a situation in which I may believe it. But any such 
situation is one in which I precisely do not believe (MOORE), since any situation in which I do 
believe it is not a situation in which it is true. Hence, the situation which supposedly presents 
a counterexample to the principle is not genuinely possible.  
One might respond that the relevant situation is supposed to be one in which (MOORE) 
is true at a certain time. Obviously, in that situation, I do not in fact believe (MOORE) at that 
time but, according to (TRUTH), I may do so. If I were to proceed in light of this verdict to 
believe (MOORE) at some later time, I would then believe a falsehood, which, according to 
(TRUTH), I should not believe.
20 
Bringing in temporal indices in this way only makes the problem with the objection 
from Moorean propositions more apparent. According to (TRUTH), as originally formulated, 
if a proposition is true, one may believe it. If one adds a temporal index to the antecedent of 
the relevant conditional, then surely one must also add the same temporal index to the 
consequent, as follows: if a proposition is true at t, one may believe it at t. Once again, then, 
the situation which is supposed to present a problem for (TRUTH) is not a genuine possibility. 
In a situation in which (MOORE) is true at a time, then, according to (TRUTH), I may believe 
that proposition at that time. But any such situation is one in which I do not believe (MOORE) 
at that time.   
So, there is no possible situation in which a subject believes what, according to 
(TRUTH), she may believe only to find herself in a situation in which she believes what, 
according to (TRUTH), she may not believe. Again, one might worry about a norm which 
                                                           
20 One might worry about the idea that a proposition has a truth-value at a certain time, at least insofar as that 
invites the idea that it might have a different truth-value at a different time. I share this worry but set it aside for 
present purposes. 13 
 
states that one may do something one cannot do but, again, there is no principle that may 
implies can. 
 
5  Evidential norms  
McHugh complains about the version of the norm governing belief I advance on the grounds 
that it ‘was supposed to explain other epistemic norms as being derivative from it’:
21 
 
[(TRUTH)] will not explain why you should tend to believe […] propositions for which you 
have sufficient evidence, even utterly compelling evidence (if you form any attitude to them). 
At most, they will entail that this is not something you shouldn’t do. […] So, on this account, 
the epistemic normative landscape becomes rather sparse. (2012: 18) 
 
Relatedly, McHugh complains that (TRUTH) cannot explain why evidence that p is a reason to 
believe that p, that is, a consideration which favours of doing so, only why evidence against p 
is reason not to believe that p (2012: 18-19). 
I agree that, if (TRUTH) holds, one would expect there to be a derived norm according 
to which one may believe that p if and only if one has sufficient evidence that p, but not one 
according to which one should believe that p if one has sufficient evidence that p (cf. Whiting 
2010: §6).
22 I also agree that, if (TRUTH) holds, evidence that p is at most justification for 
believing that p, not a reason for so believing.
23 Unlike McHugh, I take all of this to be a 
virtue of the formulation I recommend, not a vice. The epistemic normative landscape is 
indeed a sparse one.
24  
                                                           
21 McHugh (2012: 17-18) also criticises (TRUTH) by appeal to considerations relating to withholding belief or 
suspending judgement. The nature of this attitude and of the norms governing it are large issues, which I shall 
have to address on another occasion. 
22 I shall not here tackle the issue of what it takes for evidence to count as sufficient, or of how to reconcile or 
adjudicate the verdicts the evidential norm and (TRUTH) deliver where they appear to diverge. 
23 Cf. n8 above. 
24 I defend this claim in Whiting 2012: §5.See also Littlejohn 2012: 46-48; Nelson 2010. 14 
 
  Suppose that I have evidence that the cakes are burning. Whatever provides this 
evidence provides evidence for an infinite number of other beliefs, such as that there are 
cakes, that the cakes are burning or that Tolstoy wrote Great Expectations, that if the cakes 
are burning then the cakes are burning, that there is more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
than there was before I made the cakes, that there is no dancing monkey singing the national 
anthem in the space the cakes occupy, and so on without end. Given the principle that ought 
implies can, it is not the case that I should believe each and every one of these propositions.  
  As noted earlier, the principle that ought implies can is controversial. Fortunately, I do 
not need to rely on it. It is just implausible to suggest that, for each and every proposition 
which the evidence supports, one ought to believe it. Surely, a norm which asks this of a 
subject is absurdly demanding.  
  If someone were to continue to insist that there is an evidential norm according to 
which one ought to follow one’s evidence, there is a danger of stalemate. To avoid this, 
consider a point McHugh makes to further his case: 
It might be suggested that the epistemic normative landscape is sparse in this way. But that 
would not tally with our ordinary epistemic assessments. (2012: 18) 
On the contrary. If I were to believe that the Liberal Democrats will win the next election in 
the face of overwhelming evidence that they will lose, or simply in the absence of any 
evidence that they will win, I might be stupid, daft, irrational, stubborn, or rash. It would not 
be out of the ordinary to criticise me in one of these ways. But it would be out of the ordinary 
to criticise me were I simply not to believe all and any propositions which the evidence 
supports. After all, right now there are many such propositions which I do not believe. If I am 
stupid, daft, etc., it is not for that reason.  
  McHugh might reply that I have overlooked the parenthetical remark: ‘if you form 
any attitude to them’. The idea is not that, for each proposition one’s evidence supports, one 15 
 
ought to believe it but that, if one adopts some attitude toward a proposition one’s evidence 
supports, it ought to be an attitude of belief.  
If evidence that a proposition is true on its own provides no reason for believing that 
proposition, and so could not make it the case that one should do so, as the parenthetical 
remark seems to grant, it is hard to see how the mere fact that one is adopting an attitude 
toward the proposition could supply the outstanding reason so to believe or make it the case 
that one should. That looks like bootstrapping.
25 
Of course, if one has a reason to adopt some attitude toward the relevant proposition, 
then perhaps one should adopt belief, given that the evidence supports it. A teacher might 
have reason to have a view about the aptitude of her pupil and so, if the evidence shows that 
the pupil lacks talent, she ought to believe this. But, of course, one should not expect the 
norm which governs believing on its own to explain why, in such a case, the subject has 
reason or ought to believe what the evidence supports, since that turns on non-epistemic or 
non-alethic considerations. 
 
6  Motivation 
McHugh makes another complaint concerning the explanatory adequacy of (TRUTH). The 
principle (or, I would add, our acceptance of it) ‘will explain why we are motivated not to 
believe propositions for which we lack evidence’, but not ‘why we are ever motivated to 
believe anything’, at least when we have no existing interest in or concern for the subject 
matter (2012: 19). As discussed earlier, if one accepts (TRUTH), one aims to believe a 
proposition only if it is true, but one does not aim to believe a proposition if it is true. 
  Where a subject is motivated to φ, she is typically motivated by certain considerations, 
that is, by (what she takes) to be reasons for φing; and, if a subject takes there to be a reason 
                                                           
25 In something like Bratman’s sense (1987: 24-27). 16 
 
for her to φ, she is typically motivated to φ (cf. Alvarez 2010: 56-59). Since I deny that 
evidence provides a reason for believing, it is no surprise that I deny that subjects are 
motivated to believe by evidence alone. However, it is entirely consistent with the view I 
recommend that subjects often are motivated to believe, and motivated by their evidence, 
since it is consistent with that view that subjects often (take themselves to) have independent 
reasons for having beliefs about certain subject matters, and hence aim to do so. It is also 
consistent with the view that subjects are often motivated to believe out of natural curiosity 
and the like. Still, it is worth asking what I might say about those cases where such an aim or 
motivational state is lacking.  
  Suppose George opens his eyes, sees that he has two hands, and as a result forms the 
belief that he has two hands. No doubt his perceptual experience is in some way responsible 
for his belief but I am not sure what the grounds are for insisting that what George saw 
motivated his belief. Perhaps the worry is that to deny this is to deny that George believes 
what he does for a reason. But one can still say that George believes with or in light of the 
justification for doing so, namely, the fact that he has two hands, and that he does so thanks 
to the successful exercise of a perceptual capacity.
26 So, to deny that George’s belief is 
motivated is not to say that it is formed blindly. 
  Suppose, however, that one asks George why he believes that he has two hands. It 
would be entirely unsurprising if he were to answer: Because I saw them. If George were 
here citing the reason for which he believes, a reason provided by the evidence made 
available by his perceptual experience, and if taking oneself to have such a reason involves 
being motivated so to believe, then it might seem I am committed to claiming that George’s 
answer is false (if not insincere).  
                                                           
26 It is telling that it is odd to speak of doing something for a justification. 17 
 
  In giving his answer, I suggest, George is citing an explanatory reason for his belief—
that he saw his hands is a reason why George believes that he has two hands, but it need not 
be a reason for which he believes.
27 Moreover, in giving this explanation, George might be 
indicating that he has justification for his belief, insofar as seeing that one has two hands is a 
very good way of securing justification for believing that one does. So, (TRUTH) 
notwithstanding, it is not difficult to make sense of both the question George is asked and his 
answer to it. 
Of course, one should not put too much weight on one example. The point is only that 
it is not a given that subjects are motivated to believe propositions (simply) by the evidence 
they take themselves to have, and so it is something one can appeal to, at least not without 
further ado, in criticising (TRUTH). 
 
7  Conclusion 
In this paper, I have defended my formulation of the norm of truth which governs belief. On 
the assumption that subjects in some sense recognise and accept that norm, I have thereby 
defended the idea that subjects aim to believe only what is true. A recurring theme in the 
discussion has been whether a norm which does not incorporate some version of the thought 
that one ought to believe what is true will do the business, that is, whether it will explain the 
ways in which we are moved in forming and revising beliefs and the various dimensions 
along which those beliefs are evaluated. I have suggested that it does, in large part by 
suggesting that the number of those movements and dimensions is less than it might seem. 
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